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STATEMENT OF CASE 
 
(i) Nature of the Case. 
 This is an appeal from the decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission in the 
consolidated hearing of the 2011 George McGivney  (hereafter McGivney) v. Aerocet, 
Inc./Idaho State Insurance Fund claim (hereafter Aerocet) and the 2014 George McGivney 
(hereafter McGivney) v. Quest Aircraft/Federal Insurance Company claim (hereafter Quest). 
(ii) Course of Proceedings 
 Overview. Aerocet asserts that it was err for the Commission to consolidate the claims 
for hearing and thus a more detailed Course of Proceedings is believed to be in order. Aerocet 
was provided every opportunity to litigate McGivney’s claim against it separately from 
McGivney’s claim against Quest. While McGivney’s motion to consolidate was pending, and 
prior to Aerocet making or filing an objection to the motion to consolidate, Aerocet, without 
objection, willingly participated in the joint deposition of McGivney. Also, even though the 
order consolidating the two claims specifically permitted Aerocet to reassert its objection to 
consolidation if Aerocet later determined that separation was warranted, Aerocet never requested 
that the consolidation order be reconsidered either by the Referee or the Commissioners.  
 May 6, 2011 Aerocet accident. On January 12, 2012, after McGivney’s treating 
physician released him to return to work performing activities as tolerated and provided him an 
impairment rating, Aerocet filed a “Summary of Payments” with the Commission. Clmt Exh.12, 
p. 5; FFCL&Order ¶40. Aerocet has never filed a Notice of Change of Status as required 
pursuant to I.C. §72-806 and IDAPA 17.02.08.061.01 when there is a “denial…or cessation of 
medical or monetary compensation benefits to which the worker might…ultimately be entitled.”   
On November 24, 2014, McGivney filed a Complaint against Aerocet for additional 
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compensation.  R p. 1.  In relevant part, Aerocet’s December 11, 2014, Answer asserted the 
following two affirmative defenses:  
 “3. Defendants deny that Claimant’s condition is a result of an accident arising out of and 
       in the course of his/her employment and, therefore, deny that he/she is entitled to any 
        benefits. R p. 5.  
 “4. Defendants further allege that Claimant’s current condition is the result of subsequent 
       activity and, therefore, not related to the alleged injury.” (emphasis added) R p. 5. 
 
 May 5, 2014 Quest claim. McGivney filed a pro se Complaint against Quest on July 28, 
2014. R p. 133. On August 12, 2014, Quest filed its Answer. R p. 139. In relevant part, Quest’s 
Answer admitted that Claimant’s condition “was caused partly” by his 2014 accident. It also 
raised as an affirmative defense the issue of whether its responsibility for McGivney’s left knee 
injury should be limited because of his 2011 injury to his left knee pursuant to I.C. §72-406. R 
pp. 139-140.  
 Scheduling Deposition of McGivney. On April 24, 2015, Quest served Notice that it 
was deposing McGivney on May 12, 2015, at 10:30 a.m. On April 28, Aerocet served Notice 
that it was deposing McGivney on the same day at the same time. Aerocet’s Notice was sent not 
only to McGivney’s attorney but also Quest’s attorney.  
 April 29, 2015, Motion to Consolidate. McGivney filed a Motion to Consolidate the 
2014 Quest claim with the 2011 Aerocet claim which stated in part: 
 “It is submitted that it is in the best interest of justice that this case be consolidated with 
   the SIF case I.C. No. 2011-011043 [Aerocet] so that the Commission can determine  
   which surety is responsible for Claimant’s injuries and order that surety to provide  
   benefits. Due to the intertwining facts, it is in the best interest of the parties to present 
   all evidence to the Commission for a global resolution. Consolidating this case with  
   I.C. No. 2011-011043 [Aerocet] would also serve judicial economy be [sic] saving 
`   the Referee(s) and Commissioners time in review complex and intertwining records 
   and testimony.” R pp. 6, 142-143.1 
                                                          
1 The Agency Record has two ‘file’ stamp dates; April 29, 2015 (R p. 6); May 1, 2015 (R p. 141) 
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 On April 29, 2015, Quest filed a Notice of Non-Opposition to the motion to consolidate. 
R p. 19.  
On May 12, 2015, McGivney was deposed by both Aerocet and Quest in a joint 
deposition that was separately noticed in each claim for the same date and time. R Exh List Clmt 
Exh 11, Def Exh 10, and Def Exh 22. Aerocet did not assert at said deposition that it had any 
objection to the motion to consolidate or that it had any objection deposing McGivney 
simultaneously with Quest.   
On May 14, 2015, Aerocet filed an objection to the motion to consolidate with the 
Commission. In view of Aerocet not making any objection to the joint deposition of McGivney, 
it would appear that since the certificate of service indicates the Aerocet’s objection was placed 
in the regular U.S. Mail on May 12th, that it was not mailed until sometime after the deposition of 
on May 12th.  R p. 22.  The objection did not claim it was prejudiced by the consolidation, it 
merely stated that, “It is unnecessary to duly complicate I.C. 2011-011043 with a subsequent 
case with a different employer.” Id.  
On May 18, 2015, McGivney filed his response to Aerocet’s objection to consolidation. 
In part, the response states: 
“Even though Claimant’s Motions to Consolidate had not yet been granted or denied, 
  Claimant made himself available to both employers and sureties to have his deposition 
  taken on May 12, 2015. Defendants’ [Aerocet] attorney did not inform Claimant there 
  was an objection to consolidating his two claims and he participated in the deposition 
  on May 12th…Claimant’s attorney did not receive, and was not made aware of, the  
  objection until May 14, 2015. Defendants’ [Aerocet] actions are inexplicable to the 
  Claimant.” R p. 25.  
 
May 19, 2015 Order to Consolidate. The Referee ordered that the Aerocet and Quest 
claims be consolidated for hearing into a single proceeding because it “could result in judicial 
economy.”  Significantly, the Referee further ordered: 
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“As the matter unfolds, counsel for State Insurance Fund may renew his  
  objection if warranted.” R p. 26.   
 
June 24, 2015, Notice of Hearing. The Commission scheduled the consolidated hearing 
for January 6, 2016. R 38.  
September 14, 2015, Motion for an Order pursuant to I.C. §72-313. McGivney filed a 
Motion to compel Quest and its surety to pay medical benefits and TTD and PPI compensation. 
It states in part: 
“The Quest accident is most recent in time. Responsibility for McGivney’s medical care 
  and temporary total disability benefits are issues of dispute between the two employer/ 
  sureties. If Quest/Federal Insurance Company is ordered to pay [these benefits and  
  compensation] this matter will be in a position for it to be re-scheduled for  
  determination of all issues…” Additionally, (while in all likelihood Quest/Federal  
  Insurance Company will not consider it necessary) the Commission may protect 
  its interest in receiving reimbursement, should Aerocet/State Insurance Fund 
  ultimately be determined to be the responsible party, by requiring a security  
  deposit pursuant to I.C. §72-313. R pp. 42-43. 
 
Response to I.C. §72-313 Motion. Quest did not respond to the motion. However 
Aerocet, even though the motion was not directed at it, responded by merely stating:  
“These Defendants maintain that all benefits related to the May 2011 injury  
  were provided to Claimant.” R pp. 45-46. 
 
September 28, 2015, Order Granting Claimant’s Motion.  The Referee granted 
McGivney’s I.C. §72-313 motion. On October 13, 2015, Aerocet filed a Motion for Clarification 
of the Order because it stated that Aerocet had also not filed a response denying liability. On 
October 28, 2015, an Amended Order Granting Claimant’s Motion reflecting that Aerocet had 
filed a response was entered. R pp. 47-52.  
December 10, 2015, McGivney’s Motion to Vacate the Hearing. This motion sought 
to vacate the hearing and set a status conference for the purpose of rescheduling the hearing. R p. 
54. It states in part: 
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“1. This case involves two separate industrial accidents that involved Claimant  
      McGivney’s left knee. The consolidated hearing will determine the extent that each 
      of the two respective employer/sureties is responsible for the condition of Claimant’s 
      left knee, permanent partial impairment and disability in excess of impairment… 
      Unfortunately, the Defendants Quest Aircraft, Employer, and Federal Insurance 
      Company, have not as of the date of this motion, scheduled an evaluation to  
      determine the percentage of permanent partial physical impairment…Without, and 
      until the PPI evaluation is completed and reviewed, the parties cannot properly  
      submit evidence to the Commission of the amount of PPI and disability in excess 
      of PPI that is attributable to each respective industrial accident.” R pp. 54-55.  
 
December 14, 2015, Aerocet’s Objection to Motion to Vacate. Aerocet asserted that: 
“the only issue calendared for hearing with respect to these Defendants is whether  
  the Claimant is entitled to permanent partial disability in excess of permanent 
  impairment and the extent thereof as it relates to the Aerocet accident. That issue 
  is ripe for hearing as scheduled on January 6, 2016.” 
Aerocet did not assert that it would be prejudiced by vacating and rescheduling the 
hearing and it did not reassert an objection to the consolidation of the two cases. The hearing was 
and reset it for December 22, 2015.   
November 8, 2016 Hearing. Aerocet did not renew its objection to the two claims being 
consolidated at the hearing. It did not renew its objection or seek review of the order 
consolidating the hearing in its post-hearing brief. Additionally, Aerocet did not file an I.C. §72-
718 post-decision motion for reconsideration or request for rehearing.  
(iii) Statement of Facts2 
 McGivney’s job duties for Aerocet required him to walk up and down stairs numerous 
times through the work-day.  Friday, May 6, 2011, near the end of his work shift as he was 
walking down the stairs, Claimant felt something “go” in his left knee which caused him 
                                                          
2 While Appellant Aerocet’s Brief’s Statement of Facts consists essentially of copying 
paragraphs 1-50 of the Commission’s decision, it should be noted that Aerocet’s footnotes are 




significant pain. He attempted to return to work on Monday, May 9th but his pain increased when 
he tried to walk up and down the stairs.  
 McGivney came under the care of orthopedic surgeon Dr. McInnis. Dr. McInnis gave 
Claimant a choice between arthroscopic meniscus surgery, which could alleviate Claimant’s 
mechanical symptoms, and a partial arthroplasty. He opted for arthroscopic surgery. He 
understood that he would still have problems with his left knee in the future due to the 
progressive degeneration of his arthritis. FFCL&O ¶7.   
Aerocet’s Answer to the Complaint denied that McGivney’s injury was caused, even 
partly, by an accident even though it paid for his medical care and a 2% permanent partial 
impairment, R p. 4.  
Following surgery, he returned to work at Aerocet on light duty under restrictions as 
generally assigned for an arthroscopic surgery; that is, no stairs and if it hurts, do not do it, for 
two weeks. FFLC&O ¶8. As a result, his light duty job required him to spend a lot of time at a 
desk and he had to get up and move around because of the discomfort in his knee. Hr. T. p. 47, l. 
1-21. After surgery, McGivney received a call from Quest, where he had previously submitted an 
application, asking him to interview for a job.  He determined that he was ready for a change, 
primarily because the “fumes” from the resins was affecting him. FFCL&O ¶9.  
 For about his first year at Quest, Claimant’s left knee felt like a “toothache” that would 
only resolve with rest. His knee would become sore whether he was walking or sitting. FFCL&O 
¶10. On March 5, 2014, after leaving a meeting with his manager, he started walking down the 
stairs and in doing so, he overstepped one step which caused his left heel to hit on the next step 
jarring his left leg.  He immediately felt stabbing pain in his left knee. He sought medical care. It 
was recommended he undergo surgery. Because his claim was denied when it was recommended 
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that he undergo a left partial unicompartmental knee arthroplasty and he was receiving no TTD 
benefits, he was required to use about six weeks of FMLA from the date of his surgery until he 
attempted to return to work. FFCL&O, p. 6, fn 2.  
The denial of Claimant’s claim created some animosity between Claimant and Quest; 
nonetheless, Claimant continued his employment until his surgery. Post-surgery, Claimant 
attempted to return to work with restrictions; however, due to a combination of an adverse 
reaction to gabapentin and a stressful work environment, after a couple of days he opted to use 
some more family medical leave and eventually resigned. FFCL&O ¶12.  
Claimant is currently employed by his wife through the United States Postal Service 
pursuant to a rural mail delivery contract. Claimant drives his own 1997 Ford Explorer that he 
converted into a right-hand drive and to which he made many alterations and modifications to fit 
his needs. At six feet, three inches tall, Claimant’s work space is cramped. His left knee swells 
and aches when sitting in one place too long while delivering mail and when he is required to get 
in and out of his vehicle to deliver packages. Claimant’s route is 104 miles long and takes 
between four and five hours, depending on the weather and time of year (more deliveries in the 
summer) to complete. Claimant’s wife also has a mail delivery contract and Claimant does most 
of the maintenance on their two mail delivery vehicles. FFCL&O ¶13. He has difficulty working 
on his mail delivery vehicle and he can no longer hike or even walk for more than a short 
distance. Hr. T. p. 70-72.  
Issues on Appeal 
 
 1. Whether Aerocet failed to preserve its objection to consolidation for review on appeal? 
2. Whether the Commission properly determined and apportioned  
    McGivney’s permanent and disability?  
3. Whether McGivney is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal 




Standard of Review 
 
The Court exercises free review over questions of law over a decision of the 
Commission. See Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996).  With 
respect to questions of fact, the Court's review is limited to determining whether substantial and 
competent evidence supports the decision. See Matter of Wilson, 128 Idaho 161, 164, 911 P.2d 
754, 757 (1996).   If the Commission's findings of fact are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence, they will not be disturbed on appeal. See Reedy v. M.H. King Co., 128 
Idaho 896, 920 P.2d 915 (1996). The Court's review of Commission decisions is limited to a 
determination of whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent 
evidence." Boley v. State, 130 Idaho 278, 280 939 P.2d 854, 856 (1997); I.C. §72-732 (1). 
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance. See Boley, 
130 Idaho at 280, 939 P.2d at 856. It is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to 
support a conclusion. Id.; Zapata v. J.R. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513, 975 P.2d 1178 (1999). 
Court "views all the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party who 
prevailed before the Commission." Boley, 130 Idaho at 280, 939 P.2d at 856 (citing Smith v. J.B. 
Parson Co., 127 Idaho 937, 908 P.2d 1244 (1996). It is within the Commission's province to 
decide what weight should be given to the facts presented and conclusions drawn from those 
facts. See Seamans v. Maaco Auto Painting & Bodyworks, 128 Idaho 747, 918 P.2d 1192 
(1996).  The Commission's conclusions on the weight and credibility of the evidence should not 
be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. See Wheaton v. Indus. Special Indem. 






1. Aerocet failed to preserve its objection to consolidation for review on appeal. 
 The law is well settled that “interlocutory orders issued by a referee that are not approved 
or adopted by the Commission are not final decision or orders and are thus not appealable. 
Peterson v. Farmore Pump & Irrigation, 119 Idaho 969, 971, 812 P.2d 276, 278 (1991).   
On April 29, 2015, McGivney moved to have both of his left knee claims consolidated 
for hearing. R, p. 6-18.  On April 29, 2015, Quest filed a notice stating it did not object to 
consolidation for purposes of hearing. R. 19.  
On May 12, 2015, while McGivney’s motion to consolidate was pending and with no 
known objection to the two claims being consolidated for hearing, McGivney was deposed by 
both Aerocet and Quest in the same deposition.  Clmt’s Exh. 11. Aerocet did not lodge any 
objection to McGivney being jointly deposed by both sets of employer/surety Defendants in the 
same deposition.  On May 14, 2015, the Aerocet Objection to Claimant’s Motion to Consolidate 
was received by the Commission. The certificate of service reflects, even though Aerocet didn’t 
lodge any objection to the joint deposition, that it was sent by regular U.S. Mail on May 12th. R, 
p. 22.  
 The Referee granted McGivney’s Motion to Consolidate, stating that “consolidation 
could result in judicial economy.” Aerocet fails to inform the Court that the consolidation order 
also specifically left the door open for Aerocet to renew its objection to consolidation:  
 “As the matter unfolds, counsel for State Insurance  Fund [Aerocet] may renew 
   his objection if warranted.” R. p. 26. (emphasis added) 
 
Aerocet did not file a prehearing motion with the Referee renewing its objection to the 
interlocutory order consolidating the two claims for purposes of hearing.  Also, Aerocet did not 
file a prehearing motion for reconsideration of the consolidation order with the Commissioners.  
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At the commencement of the hearing the Referee inquired whether any party had any 
objection(s) to the issues as he had just identified.  Aerocet did not renew its earlier objection to 
the consolidation of the cases for hearing and it did not raise any objection to the issues 
identified by the Referee. Aerocet informed the Referee that there were no other issues than 
those that he identified. Hr. T. pp. 4-8. When the Referee inquired whether any party had an 
objection to any of the exhibits offered by any party, Aerocet responded that it had no objection. 
Hr. T. p. 9, l. 19-20; p. 13, l. 2. When it filed its post-hearing brief, Aerocet did not seek 
reconsideration of the order granting consolidation.  
I.C. § 72-506(2) provides that a referee’s interlocutory order is deemed an order of the 
Commission and is appealable only if it is approved and confirmed by the commission. The 
Commission’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order does not mention Aerocet’s 
objection to consolidation or the order consolidating the two claims. Following the filing of the 
Commission’s decision, Aerocet did not seek reconsideration of the order granting consolidation 
by the Commissioners by filing an I.C. § 72-718 motion for reconsideration or a motion for 
rehearing.  
 The Notice of Appeal filed by Aerocet states that it is challenging the consolidation of the 
two claims for hearing. It states the issue as follows:   
 “The Commission errs in matter of law in consolidating I.C. 2014-019179 
    with I.C. 2011-011043;” R, p. 156 ¶ 3 (d)  
 
 Aerocet, however, modified the wording of this issue in its brief as follows:  
 “The Commission erred as a matter of law in failing to adjudicate Claimant’s 
   disability, if any, from the 2011 injury separate from the total disability found 
   and prior to apportioning the same.” Aerocet Br. p. 18. 
 
This issue merely restates Aerocet’s objection to consolidation by asserting the 
Commission erred by not deciding the 2011 injury claim separately.  
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Even if this issue can be viewed as a different issue than consolidation, Aerocet makes no 
argument that it suffered prejudice or how the Commission should have adjudicated the 2011 
injury separately and prior to apportionment. Aerocet makes no assertion that if there had been 
two separate hearings that the exact same exhibits would not have been admitted, that the exact 
same hearing testimony would not have been received, and that the exact same post-hearing 
depositions would not have been taken and made part of the record.  
Even if there had been two hearings, pursuant to I.C. §72-406 each respective 
employer/surety is only liable for the disability attributable to the accident that was suffered in its 
employment and therefore the two-step process to apportion the impairment and disability was 
required. The apportionment analysis in each separate hearing would have been the same. 
“First the Commission must determine the claimant’s disability when considering  
  the pre-existing physical impairment(s) and the subsequent injury, and second it 
  must then apportion disability between the injury and the pre-existing impairments.”  
 Christensen v. S.L. Start & Associates, Inc., 147 Idaho 289, 292, 207 P.3d 1020,  
 1023 (2009). 
 
Aerocet’s “Conclusion” reveals that it has no dispute with the two claims being 
consolidated for hearing. It is just upset that the Referee reached a different decision than the 
Commissioners. Indeed, Aerocet does not ask the Court to reverse the Commission’s decision 
and remand this matter to the Commission to hold a separate hearing on its claim but, rather, it   
makes the remarkable request of asking the Court to order the Commission to abrogate its 
statutory duty to determine the claims and defer in total to the Referee’s recommendation:  
“reverse the Commission Order and remand the 2011 proceeding to the Commission 






2. The Commission properly determined and apportioned McGivney’s  
permanent impairment and disability 
 
 On September 12, 2011, McGivney underwent left knee surgery for his Aerocet industrial 
injury.  On October 3, 2011, Dr. McInnis released McGivney to return to light duty work and 
restricted him from climbing stairs, squatting, or bending, At the next appointment he was 
“encouraged to continue to increase activity level as comfort dictates.” Clmts Exhibits 3, p. 17.  
Aerocet’s surety requested an impairment rating from Dr. McInnis.  On November 23, 
2011 he filled in the blanks on its form that McGivney’s left knee condition was fixed and stable 
and that he had suffered a permanent impairment rating of 2% impairment of his left lower 
extremity. Aerocet asserts, as a matter of law, that when Dr. McInnis provided this opinion on 
November 23, 2011, that the disability analysis for McGivney’s 2011 claim “was ripe for 
evaluation at that time” and that the Commission’s disability analysis “has to be based upon” Dr. 
McInnis’s November 23, 2011 opinion. (emphasis added) Br. pp. 21, 24. As a result, Aerocet 
further asserts that the Commission “had no alternative” but to determine his disability as of 
November 23rd and that McGivney failed to establish any disability in excess of impairment 
because he returned to work.  Br. p. 24.  (emphasis added) 
Ripe 
 
The word “ripe” is a legal term of art. The ripeness doctrine requires that the person 
asserting that a matter is “ripe” has the burden of proving: 
 (1) The case presents definite and concrete issues; 
 (2) That a real and substantial controversy exists; and 
 (3) That there is a present need for adjudication.  
 City of Boise v. Keep the Commandments Coalition, 143 Idaho 254, 258 
 141 P.3d 1123, 1126 (2006). 
 
Even if it were to be ‘presumed’ that the first two burdens were met in 2011,                                                                                                 
there was no “present need for adjudication.” There was no case pending before the Commission. 
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McGivney had not filed a “Complaint” with the Commission seeking an adjudication of any 
issue. The first time that there was a “present need for adjudication” arose was when 
McGivney’s November 21, 2014, Complaint was filed. R p. 1. Prior to the filing of the 
Complaint, there is no evidence that an event had occurred that could arguably be deemed as 
triggering a present need for adjudication.  
Aerocet’s own actions dispel the existence of a present need for adjudication.  The 
“Summary of Payments” dated January 16, 2012, filed with the Commission, makes no assertion 
that there existed a present need for an adjudication. In fact, the Commission’s ‘stamp’ 
specifically documents that jurisdiction was retained by the Commission until the statute of 
limitations expired. Clmts Exhibit 12, p. 5. Also, since there is no evidence that the State 
Insurance Fund filed a “Form 8” notice of the cessation of benefits per Idaho Code §72-806,  any 
statute of limitation provisions of I.C. §72-806 that could have otherwise potentially become 
applicable at some point in time were tolled by operation of I.C. §72-604. see IDAPA 
17.02.08.061.01; Austin v. Bio Tech Nutrients, IC 2008-038504, Filed 3/26/2018 (Appendix). 
Permanent Impairment 
 
 “Permanent impairment” is any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss after maximal 
medical rehabilitation has been achieved and which abnormality or loss, medically, is considered 
stable or nonprogressive at the time of the evaluation. I.C. §72-422. A determination of physical 
impairment is a question of fact for the Commission. The Commission, in conducting a 
permanent impairment evaluation, is not limited to record or opinion evidence of a physician 
requested to give a permanent impairment rating. Soto v. J.R. Simplot, 126 Idaho 536, 539, 887 
P. 2d 1043, 1046 (1994).  
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It is not unusual for subsequently obtained medical testing and evaluations to reveal that, 
in fact, the medical condition had not stabilized and surreptitiously progressively gotten worse. 
Colpaert v. Larson’s Inc., 115 Idaho 825, 771 P.2d 46 (1989); Hernandez v. Phillips, 141 Idaho 
779, 782, 118 P.3d 111, 114 (2005).  See also, Harrison v. Osco Drug, Inc., 116 Idaho 470, 473, 
776 P.2d 1189, 1192 (1989).  
Two Idaho statutes inherently provide for the reality that a claimant’s post-injury 
condition may continue to progressively deteriorate after an impairment rating is provided. 
Neither statute is specifically applicable in this matter, but each bears mention.   
I.C. §72-706 (2) recognizes that a condition may progressively deteriorate.  It provides 
that if benefits have been paid, a claimant is entitled, for a period of at least five (5) years since 
the date of the accident, to seek “further compensation” in the event the injury progressively 
deteriorates.  
“When payments of compensation have been made and thereafter discontinued,  
the claimant shall have five (5) years from the date of the accident causing the 
injury or date of first manifestation of an occupational disease within which  
to make and file with the commission an application requesting a hearing for 
further compensation and award.”   
 
 I.C. §72-719 provides in relevant part as follows: 
 “(1) On application made by a party in interest filed with the commission at any  
        time within five (5) years of the date of the accident causing the injury or  
        date of first manifestation of an occupational disease, on the ground of a  
        change in conditions, the Commission may…review any order or agreement  
        or award upon any of the following grounds: 
 
   (a) Change in the nature or extent of the employee’s injury or disablement;” 
The determination by the Commission of the extent of permanent impairment suffered by 
McGivney as a result of his 2011 industrial injury was not necessary until McGivney filed a 
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Complaint regarding his March 5th industrial accident with the Commission on November 24, 
2014.  R p. 1.   
Based upon the bilateral knee x-rays taken shortly after McGivney’s 2014 accident, Dr. 
McNulty thoroughly and persuasively described how McGivney’s left knee condition had, in 
fact, not been fixed and stable but rather was in the process of progressively deteriorating at the 
time of Dr. McInnis’ evaluation in 2011.   Dr. McNulty would expect that the Grade 2 arthritis 
found in Claimant’s left knee in 2011 would continue to progress at a rate greater than what may 
have been present in Claimant’s right knee due to his left knee injury. Dr. McNulty’s expectation 
proved to be true by the 2014 weight bearing x-rays that demonstrated a decreased joint space of 
the left knee as compared to the right and was considered to be a Grade 4 at that time. FFCL&O 
¶41.  
The Commissioners clearly set forth their close review of the medical record and the 
solid basis for their giving the opinions of Dr. McNulty, regarding stability, impairment rating, 
and apportionment, weight over Dr. McInnis’ opinions, based on radiographic evidence 
documenting the deterioration in McGivney’s left knee subsequent to the opinion of Dr. 
McInnis.  
    “Dr. McInnis originally proposed that following the 2011 meniscectomy, Claimant  
      was entitled to a 2% lower extremity rating…Dr. McNulty acknowledged that this  
      2% rating was appropriate at the time it was issued. (emphasis added) However, 
      Dr. McNulty ultimately concluded that half of Claimant’s current 21% lower 
                 extremity rating should be apportioned to the 2011 accident. Explaining his reasoning,  
      he testified that the 2011 meniscectomy destabilized Claimant’s left knee, and caused 
      the progression of arthritic changes in the medial compartment of the left knee much 
      faster than would otherwise have happened. Proof of this acceleration is found in the 
      bilateral knee x-rays performed after the 2014 accident. These films demonstrate 
                 much more severe degenerative arthritis in the left medial compartment as compared  
                 to the right medial compartment…Based on these findings, Dr. McNulty believes it 
      appropriate to apportion Claimant’s impairment on a 50-50 basis as between the  
      accident of 2011 and the accident of 2014…Dr. Lyman, the surgeon who performed  
16 
 
      Claimant’s left knee arthroplasty, concurs with this analysis.  
     While we recognize that following the 2011 accident Claimant was given only a 
     2% lower extremity rating, and released without limitations/restrictions, the 
     important point is that Claimant’s left knee condition continued to deteriorate 
     following the date of Dr. McInnis’ rating, and that this deterioration has been 
     persuasively linked to the 2011 accident. By the time of the 2014 accident,  
     Claimant’s medial  compartment arthritis had significantly progressed to Grade III-IV 
     changes, with the two areas of complete cartilage loss. The accident-caused  
     progression of Claimant’s left knee condition between 2011 and 2014 amply  
     supports the apportionment scheme arrived at by Dr. McNulty.” R. p. 128-29 ¶70.  
     (emphasis added). 
 
   The Commission is not bound to accept one side's medical opinion evidence over 
conflicting contrary medical evidence or the opinion of any particular doctor that a patient's 
condition is stable and ratable.  Paulson v. Idaho Forest Industries, Inc., 99 Idaho 896, 591 P.2d 
143 (1979), citing Graves v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 87 Idaho 451, 394 P.2d 290 
(1964). The Commission is the ultimate evaluator of impairment. Urry v. Walker & Fox 
Masonry, 115 Idaho 750, 755, 769 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1989). 
 A finding or award of a referee is not final and binding on the Commission. The findings 
of a referee are only recommendations that are submitted to the Commissioners for their review 
and decision on whether or not to adopt them as their own. §72-506, §72-717.  A referee’s 
recommended findings and awards are not those of the Commission unless the Commissioners 
approve and confirm them. Zapata v. J.R. Simplot Company, 132 Idaho 513, 975 P.2d 1178 
(1999).   The findings of fact made by the referee were merely recommendations to the Industrial 
Commission. Upon reviewing those findings, it could either adopt them or enter its own findings. 
The Commission is not required to explain why it did not adopt findings recommended by the 




 Disability  
A determination by the Commission as to the degree of permanent disability resulting 
from an industrial injury is a factual question. See Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3, 5, 896 P.2d 
329, 331 (1995); Thom v. Callahan, 97 Idaho 151, 157, 540 P.2d 1330, 1336 (1975). (observing 
that the degree of permanent disability is a factual question committed to the particular expertise 
of the Commission.) As such, it will not be disturbed on appeal when supported by substantial 
and competent evidence. See Sund, 127 Idaho at 5, 896 P.2d at 331. Zapata v. J.R. Simplot 
Company, 132 Idaho 513, 516, 975 P.2d 1178, 1181. (1999).  
The progressive deterioration of McGivney’s left knee condition following his May 6, 
2011, industrial accident and subsequent surgery, came to an abrupt end on March 5, 2014, when 
he suffered the Quest industrial accident and he underwent left knee medial unicompartmental 
arthroplasty.  The condition of McGivney’s knee immediately prior to his March 5th injury 
became the point of maximum medical improvement for the determination of his permanent 
impairment due to his May 6, 2011, industrial accident.  
Aerocet asserts that I.C. §72-425 requires that McGivney’s disability “has to be” based 
on, and determined “at the date of,” Dr. McInnis’ November 2011, impairment rating. Contrary 
to Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 333, 870 P.2d 1292 (1994). This assertion by 
Aerocet appears to be based upon, but without citation to, Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp., 147 
Idaho 186, 207 P.3d 162 (2009).  The Court however rejected Aerocet’s assertion in its decision 
in Brown v. The Home Depot, 152 Idaho 605, 272 P.3d 577 (2012).  
 “[T]he disability rating is a measure of the claimant’s ‘present and probable future 
   ability to engage in gainful activity.’ The word ‘present’ implies that the Commission 
   is to consider the claimant’s ability to work as of the time evidence is received.  
   There is no ‘present’ opportunity for the Commission to make its determination   




Brown clarified that Stoddard only was meant to emphasize that no disability 
determination can be made prior to the determination of permanent impairment and that “it is the 
claimant’s personal and economic circumstances at the time of the hearing, not at some earlier 
time, that are relevant to the disability determination.” Brown, 125 Idaho at 609, 272 P.3d at 609.  
Given the progressive deterioration manifested by his Quest injury, the extent of disability 
McGivney suffered as a result of his May 6, 2011, accident is as it is found to have existed just 
prior to the Quest injury. However, since no Complaint had been filed asking the Commission to 
determine disability and, since “it is the claimant’s personal and economic circumstances at the 
time of the hearing, not at some earlier time, that are relevant to the disability determination,” the 
time for determination of the extent of McGivney’s disability due to his 2011 accident is the 
hearing date.     
The assessment of disability under Idaho workers’ compensation law is to be calculated 
according to “the actual or presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced or absent 
because of medical factor of permanent impairment and pertinent nonmedical factors as provided 
in I.C. §72-430. Tarbet v. J.R. Simplot Company, 151 Idaho 755, 264, P.3d 394 (2011); Graybill 
v. Swift & Company, 115 Idaho 293, 294, 766 P.2d 763, 764 (1988).  The focus of a 
determination of permanent disability is on the claimant’s ability to engage in gainful activity. 
Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3, 7, 896 P.2d 329 333 (1995).  
The Commission’s determination that McGivney’s disability rating was 50% of the 
whole person, inclusive of his 21% lower extremity impairment, is supported by substantial and 
competent evidence.  The Commission made findings regarding McGivney’s age, educational 
background, employment history, occupation at the time of injury, nature of the physical 
disablement, subsequent impairment, work limitations, geographic area labor market, his 
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personal and economic circumstances, and his immediate and future ability to obtain work. The 
Commission’s disability determination was that, while McGivney was able to obtain a 
comparable wage in a quality assurance position based on his work history and that he would 
likely impress other potential employers with his ability to learn and work hard, “all other factors 
reduce Claimant’s employability: his work restrictions, his age, his lack of formal education, his 
spotty work history prior to 2004, and the fact that no matter where he works, he will most likely 
have to commute.” The Commission further emphasized that McGivney’s lack of formal 
education and physical work restrictions would make it difficult for him to be able to earn a 
comparable wage without education and within his restrictions, even if he is willing to drive to 
Spokane for the position.  FFCL&O ¶ 66.   
 The Commission’s determination of the degree of permanent disability resulting from an 
industrial injury is a factual question committed to the particular expertise of the Commission. 
McCabe v. J-Ann Stores, Inc., 145 Idaho 91, 175 P.3d 780 (2007). The Court will not try the 
matter anew by weighing the evidence and acting similar to a trial court. The Court is neither 
concerned that a referee’s recommendation was not adopted by the Commission nor will the 
Court consider whether it would have reached the same conclusion based upon the evidence 
presented. Riggs v. Estate of Standless, 127 Idaho 427, 901 P.2d 1328 (1995); Pomerinke v. 
Excel Trucking Trans., 124 Idaho 301, 305, 859 P.2d 337, 341 (1993).  
Apportionment of Disability   
Once the evidence was received at the time of the hearing it was also necessary to 
apportion his disability between his 2011 and his 2014 industrial injuries. I.C. §72-406. 
Christensen v. S.L. Start & Associates, Inc., 147 Idaho 289, 292, 207 P.3d 1020, 1023 (2009).  
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In Horton v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 115 Idaho 912, 915, 772 P.2d 119, 122 (1989), 
the Court established a two-step analysis for apportioning disability: 
(1) Evaluate the claimant’s permanent disability in light of all his physical requirements 
      resulting from the industrial accident and any pre-existing conditions, existing at  
      the time of the evaluation; and 
 
(2) Apportion the amount of permanent disability attributable to the industrial accident. 
 
 Unlike Weygint v. J.R. Simplot Company, 123 Idaho 200, 206,  846 P.2d 202, 204, 
(1993), The Commission clearly set forth its rationale for its apportionment of McGivney’s 
disability between the 2011 Aerocet accident and the 2014 Quest accident.  
“As to the issue of whether Claimant’s disability should be apportioned between  
  the 2011 and 2014 accidents, we conclude that the medical evidence referenced  
  above supports a similar apportionment of disability over and above impairment.  
  The principal reason for performing the left knee arthroplasty was to address  
  the profound medial compartment damage noted in 2014. As both Dr. McNulty and  
  Dr. Lyman have indicated, Claimant’s medial knee arthritis was the product of both  
  the 2011 and 2014 accidents. While Claimant may have been able to return to his  
  time-of-injury job following the 2011 accident this fact does not denigrate  
  our conclusion that Claimant’s current disability is referable to significant medial 
  compartment arthritis caused by both the 2011 and 2014 accidents. While we recognize  
  that arguments could be made to support a different outcome, like Dr. McNulty and Dr. 
  Lyman, we believe that ours is the fairest approach. Therefore, Claimant’s disability  
  over and above impairment is apportioned equally between Aerocet and Quest. 
 
The Commission is presumed by its experience to be able to judge the causative factors 
in a particular case, and be allowed a degree of latitude in making apportionment. Reiher v. 
American Fine Foods, 126 Idaho 58, 2, 878 P.2d 757, 761 (1994). The Commission explained 
the rationale for its apportionment of McGivney’s disability. Its evaluation of the evidence 
relative to the apportionment of McGivney’s disability establishes that it is based upon 
substantial competent evidence justifying the apportionment equivalent to its apportionment of 
physical impairment.  
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3. McGivney is entitled to an award of costs and  
attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 11.2 
McGivney requests that the Court award him costs and attorney fees pursuant to I.A.R. 
11.2 which provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party 
has read the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief or other document; that to the best  
of the signer’s knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry is well 
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for 
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation. If the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief or 
other document is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon 
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party,  
or both, an appropriate sanction which may include an order to pay the other party 
or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of  
the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief or other document including a reasonable 
attorney’s fee.  
Attorney fees can be awarded as sanctions when a party or attorney violates either (a) the 
frivolous filings clause, or (b) the improper purpose clause. Sims v. Jacobson, 342 P.3d 907, 914 
(Idaho 2015).  
Aerocet did not preserve for consideration on appeal the objection it filed with the referee 
to McGivney’s motion to consolidate the 2011 Aerocet claim with the 2014 Quest claim for 
hearing. Even though Aerocet modified the wording of the consolidation issue it appears that its 
argument is really not consolidation but, rather, that it doesn’t like the Commission’s decision. 
The relief sought by Aerocet is not a reversal and remand for a ‘separate’ hearing, but rather, that 
the Court order the Commission to adopt the Referee’s “conclusion.”  
This appeal has resulted in McGivney having to go without all of the proceeds awarded 
to him by the Commission in its decision. As a result of many years practicing law and making 
arguments and filing appeals on what seemed to be legitimate authority and argument when 
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others may have disagreed, it is difficult for McGivney’s undersigned attorney to categorically 
assert that Aerocet’s appeal is incomprehensible, unreasonable, and lacking in law. However, it 
does at least appear to the undersigned that perhaps Aerocet’s appeal could be so characterized 
and thus be in violation of I.A.R. 11.2. That characterization and determination, however is one 
that only the ultimate arbiter, the Court, can make.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 It is respectfully requested that the Court affirm the Commission’s decision and award 
McGivney costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
 Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of July, 2018. 
 _____/S/ Starr Kelso_______________________ 






CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: 
 
 I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of July, 2018, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF RESPONDENT GEORGE MCGIVNEY was served by regular U.S. 
Mail, postage prepaid thereon, upon the attorneys for Appellant Aerocet and Respondent Quest.  
 
H. James Magnuson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 2288 
Coeur d’Alene, ID 83816 
Attorney for Appellant Aerocet 
 
Eric S. Bailey 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1007 
Boise, ID 83701-1007 
Attorney for Respondent Quest 
 
___/S/ Starr Kelso_____________ 
Starr Kelso   
Table of Contents 
17.02.08 - Miscellaneous Provisions 
000. Legal Authority. . ................................................................................................ 2 
001. Title And Scope. . ............................................................................................... 2 
002. Written Interpretations. . ..................................................................................... 2 
003. Administrative Appeals. . ................................................................................... 2 
004. Incorporation By Reference. . ............................................................................ 2 
005. Office - Office Hours - Mailing Address And Street Address. . ........................ 2 
006. Public Records Act Compliance. . ...................................................................... 2 
007. -- 032. (Reserved) ............................................................................................. 2 
033. Rule Governing Approval Of Attorney Fees 
In Workers' Compensation Cases. . ................................................................ 2 
034. -- 060. (Reserved) ............................................................................................. 4 
061. Rule Governing Notice To Claimants Of Status Change 
Pursuant To Section 72-806, Idaho Code. . .................................................... 4 





17.02.08- MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
000. LEGALAUTHORITY. 
These rules are adopted and promulgated by the Industrial Commission pursuant to the provision of Section 72-508, 
Idaho Code. (4-7-11) 
001. TITLE AND SCOPE. 
These rules shall be cited as ID APA 17 .02.08, "Miscellaneous Provisions." 
002. WRITTEN INTERPRETATIONS. 
No written interpretations of these rules exist. 
003. ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS. 
(4-7-11) 
(4-7-11) 
There is no administrative appeal from decisions of the Industrial Commission in workers' compensation matters, as 
the Commission is exempted from contested-cases provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. ( 4-7-11) 
004. INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE. 
No documents have been incorporated by reference into these rules. (4-7-11) 
005. OFFICE - OFFICE HOURS - MAILING ADDRESS AND STREET ADDRESS. 
This office is open from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., except Saturday, Sunday, and legal holidays. The department's 
mailing address is: P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0041. The principal place of business is 700 S. Clearwater 
Lane, Boise, ID 83712. (4-7-11) 
006. PUBLIC RECORDS ACT COMPLIANCE. 
Any records associated with these rules are subject to the provisions of the Idaho Public Records Act, Title 74, 
Chapter 1, and Title 41, Idaho Code. (4-7-11) 
007. -032. (RESERVED) 
033. RULE GOVERNING APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY FEES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
CASES. 
01. Authority and Definitions. Pursuant to Sections 72-404, 72-508, 72-707, 72-735 and 72-803, 
Idaho Code, the Commission promulgates this rule to govern the approval of attorney fees. ( 4-7-11) 
a. "Available funds," means a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It shall not include 
any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to claimant's agreement to retain the attorney. ( 4-7-11) 
b. nApproval by Commission," means the Commission has approved the attorney fees in conjunction 
with an award of compensation or a lump sum settlement or otherwise in accordance with this rule upon a proper 
showing by the attorney seeking to have the fees approved_ (4-7-11) 
c. "Charging lien," means a lien, against a claimant's right to any compensation under the Workers' 
Compensation Jaws, which may be asserted by an attorney who is able to demonstrate that: ( 4-7-11) 
i. There are compensation benefits available for distribution on equitable principles; (4-7-11) 
ii. The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which the 




It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather than from the 
(4-7-11) 
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iv. The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case through which the 
fund was raised; and (4-7-11) 
lien. 
V. There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application of the charging 
(4-7-11) 
d. ·'Fee agreement," means a written document evidencing an agreement between a claimant and 
counsel, in conformity with Rule 1.5, Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct (IRPC). (4-7-11) 
e. "Reasonable," means that an attorney's fees are consistent with the fee agreement and are to be 
satisfied from available funds, subject to the element of reasonableness contained iri IRPC 1.5. (4-7-11) 
i. In a case in which no hearing on the merits has been held, twenty-five percent (25%) of available 
funds shall be presumed reasonable; or (4-7-11) 
ii. In a case in which a hearing has been held and briefs submitted (or waived) under Judicial Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (JRP}, Rules X and XI, thirty percent (30%) of available funds shall be presumed reasonable; 
or (4-7-11) 
111. In any case in which compensation is paid for total permanent disability, fifteen percent (15%) of 
such disability compensation after ten (I 0) years from date such total permanent disability payments commenced. 
(4-7-11) 
02. Statement of Charging Lien. (4-7-11) 
a. All requests for approval of fees shall be deemed requests for approval ofa charging lien. (4-7-11) 
b. An attorney representing a claimant in a Workers' Compensation matter shall in any proposed lump 
sum settlement, or upon request of the Commission, file with the Commission, and serve the claimant with a copy of 
the fee agreement, and an affidavit or memorandum containing: (4-7-11) 
i. 
ii. 
The date upon which the attorney became involved in the matter; 
Any issues which were undisputed at the time the attorney became involved; 
(4-7-11) 
(4-7-11) 
m. The total dollar value of all compensation paid or admitted as owed by employer immediately prior 




Disputed issues that arose subsequent to the date the attorney was hired; 
Counsel's itemization of compensation that constihltes available funds; 




vii. Counsel's itemization of medical bills for which claim was made in the underlying action, but 
which remain unpaid by employer/surety at the time oflump sum settlement, along with counsel's explanation of the 
treatment to be given such bills/claims following approval of the lump sum settlement. (4-7-11) 
vm. The statement of the attorney identifying with reasonable detail his or her fulfillment of each 
element of the charging lien. ( 4-7-11) 
c. Upon receipt and a determination of compliance with this Rule by the Commission by reference to 
its staff, the Commission may issue an Order Approving Fees without a hearing. ( 4-7-11) 
03. Procedure if Fees Are Determined Not to Be Reasonable. (4-7-11) 
a. Upon receipt of the affidavit or memorandum, the Commission will designate staff members to 
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determine reasonableness of the fee. The Commission staff will notify counsel in writing of the staff's informal 
determination, which shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable. Omission 
of any information required by Subsection 033.02 may constitute grounds for an informal determination that the fee 
requested is not reasonable. ( 4-7-11) 
b. If counsel disagrees with the Commission staff's informal determination, counsel may file, within 
fourteen (14) days of the date of the determination, a Request for Hearing for the purpose of presenting evidence and 
argument on the matter. Upon receipt of the Request for Hearing, the Commission shall schedule a hearing on the 
matter. A Request for Hearing shall be treated as a motion under Rule III(e), JRP. (4-7-11) 
c. The Commission shall order an employer to release any available funds in excess of those subject 
to the requested charging lien and may order payment offees subject to the charging lien which have been determined 
to be reasonable. (4-7-11) 
d. The proponent of a fee which is greater than the percentage of recovery stated in Subsections 
033.01.e.i., 033.01.e.ii., or 033.01.e.iii. shall have the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence 
entitlement to the greater fee. The attorney shall always bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence his or her assertion of a charging lien and reasonableness of his or her fee. (4-7-11) 
04. Disclosure. Upon retention, the attorney shall provide to claimant a copy of a disclosure statement. 
No fee may be taken from a claimant by an attorney on a contingency fee basis unless the claimant acknowledges 
receipt of the disclosure by signing it. Upon request by the Commission, an attorney shall provide a copy of the 
signed disclosure statement to the Commission. The terms of the disclosure may be contained in the fee agreement, so 
long as it contains the text of the numbered paragraphs one (I) and two (2) of the disclosure. A copy of the agreement 
must be given to the client. The disclosure statement shall be in a format substantially similar to the following: 
State ofldaho 
Industrial Commission 
Client's name printed or typed __________________________ _ 
Attorney's name and address. _____ ~~~~-~----------------
printed or typed 
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
I. In workers' compensation matters, attorney's fees normally do not exceed twenty-five percent 
(25%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you in a case in which no hearing on the merits has been 
completed. In a case in which a hearing on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not exceed 
thirty percent (30%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you. 
2. Depending upon the circumstances of your case, you and your attorney may agree to a higher 
or lower percentage which would be subject to Commission approval. Further, if you and your attorney have a 
dispute regarding attorney fees, either of you may petition the Industrial Commission, PO Box 83720, Boise, ID 
83720-0041, to resolve the dispute. 
I certify that I have read and understand this disclosure statement. 
Client's Signature Date _________________________ _ 
Attorney's Signature Date ________________________ _ 
(4-11-15) 
034. -060. (RESERVED) 
061. RULE GOVERNING NOTICE TO CLAIMANTS OF STATUS CHANGE PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 72-806, IDAHO CODE. 
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01. Notice of Change of Status. As required and defined by Idaho Code, Section 72-806, a worker 
shall receive written notice within fifteen (15) days of any change of status or condition, inclucling, but not limited to, 
whenever there is an acceptance, commencement, denial, reduction, or cessation of medical or monetary 
compensation benefits to which the worker might presently or ultimately be entitled. Such notice is required when 
benefits are reduced to recoup any overpayment of benefits in accordance with the provisions of Section 72-316, 
Idaho Code. (3-28-18) 
02. By Whom Given. Any notice to a worker required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall be given 
by: the surety if the employer has secured Workers' Compensation Insurance; or the employer if the employer is self-
insured; or the employer if the employer carries no Workers' Compensation Insurance. (4-7-II) 
03. Form of Notice. Any notice to a worker required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall be mailed 
within ten (I 0) days by regular United States Mail to the last known address of the worker, as shown in the records of 
the party required to give notice as set forth above. The Notice shall be given in a format substantially similar to IC 
Form 8, available from the Commission and posted on the Commission's website at www.iic.idaho.gov. ( 4-11-15) 
04. Medical Reports. As required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806, if the chaoge is based on a medical 
report, the party giving notice shall attach a copy of the report to the notice. ( 4-7-1 I) 
OS. Copies of Notice. The party giving notice pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall send a 
copy of any such notice to the Industrial Commission, the employer, aod the worker's attorney, if the worker is 
represented, at the same time notice is sent to the worker. The party giving notice may supply the copy to the 
Industrial Commission in accordance with the Commission's rule on electronic submission of documents. (3-25-16) 
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BRENT AUSTIN, Claimant, 
v. 
BIO TECH NUTRIENTS, Employer, 
and 
EMPLOYERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE 
COMPANY, Surety, Defendants. 
No. IC 2008-038504 
Idaho \Vorkers Compensation 
Before the Industrial Commission of the State ofldnho 
March 26, 2018 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
AND ORDER 
Thomas E. Limbaugh, Chairman. 
INTRODUCTION 
OF LAW, 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial 
Commission assigned the above-entitled matter to Referee 
Brian Harper. The parties submitted the issue for resolution 
on stipulated facts with attached exhibits and briefing. 
Albert Matsuura, of Pocatello, represented Claimant, and 
Alan Gardner, of Boise, represented Defendants. The matter 
came under advisement on August 31, 2017. While the 
matter wns under advisement, the parties requested the 
decision be held in abeyance so they could attempt further 
settlement negotiations. The proceedings were suspended. 
On or about February 28, 2018, Defendants requested the 
Coffimission reactivate the file and render a decision. The 
undersigned Commissioners have chosen not to adopt the 
Referee's recommendation and hereby issue their own 
findings of foct, conclusions of law and order. 
ISSUE 
The sole issue to be decided is whelher Claimant's 
complaintwns timely filed under ldal10 Code § 72-706(3) 
so as to preserve his asserted claim for additional payment 
of non-medical indemnity benefits. 
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
After Claimant filed his complaint, Defendants raised the 
statue of limitations affirmative defense under Idaho Code § 
72-706(3). Claimant argues the one-year statute of 
limitations was tolled, pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-604, by 
Defendants' failure to file a required Notice of Change of 
Status and send proper written notice lo Claimant upon the 
final payment of PPI benefits as required by Idaho Code § 
72-806. Alternatively, Claimant argues that under the 
"liberal construction" requirement, he had one year to file 
his complaint from the date the Inst PPI benefit payment 
would have been paid had Defendants not accelerated the 
final paymenL Under this scenario Claimant's complaint 
was timely filed. 
Defendants argue they were under no obligation to file a 
Notice of Change of Status when they completed paying 
Claimant's PP! benefits in full, and furthennore satisfied 
their obligation under Idaho Code § 72-806. The statute of 
limitations was not tolled, and Claimant's complaint wns not 
timely filed as a matter oflaw. 
RECORD FOR REVIEW 
The record in this matter consists of the stipulated facts, 
joint exhibits A through H, Defendants' Exhibit 1, Exhibit A 
to Defendants' Motion for Judicial Notice of Publication of 
the Idaho Industrial Commission, and legal briefing 
supplied by the parties. 
STIPULATED FACTS 
The facts set forth below are taken from the parties' 
Stipulated Facts. 
1. Claimant Brent Austin was injured in the course of his 
employment with Defendant Employer Bio Tech Nutrients 
on November 20, 2008. 
2. Defendants provided Claimant with medical treatment 
from November 21, 2008 through June 20, 2014. 
3. Claimant experienced no time loss with respect to his 
November 20, 2008 injury until June 4, 2012. 
4. Defendants paid temporary total disability ("TTD11) 
benefits to Claimant for the period June 9, 2012 through 
July 18, 2014. 
5. Claimant was determined by independent medical 
evaluation to be at maximum medical improvement on June 
20, 2014. 
6. Defendants advised Claimant by Notice of Claim Status 
("NOCS") dated July 18, 2014 that his TTD benefits would 
stop effective July 18, 2014, based on Dr. Fellars' 
determination that Claimant was at maximum medical 
improvement on June 20, 2014. Joint Exhibit A. 
7. Additionally, the July 18, 2014, NOCS explained that 
Dr. Fellars rated Claimant's pennanent partial impainnent 
("PPI") at 11 % of the whole person and that Claimant 
would be paid S 18,694.50 in bi-weekly installments based 
on $339.90 per week beginning August 1, 2014, until the 
award was paid in full. Joint Exhibit A. 
8. Defendants attached a copy of Dr. Fellars' June 20, 2014, 
medical report to the July 18, 2014 NOCS. See reference in 
Joint Exhibit A. 
9. Claimant's counsel requested a benefit payment 
summary from the Surety on October 31, 2014. The Surety 
moiled o summary of paid benefits that was received by 
Claimant on November 20, 2014. The summary included an 
itemization of PPI benefits paid by the Surety Urrough the 
period ending November 21, 2014. A copy of the PPI 
payment portion of Surety's benefit summary is provided as 
Joint Exhibit B. 
IO. Payment of Claimant's PPI benefits commenced on 
July 19, 2014, as noted by the initial PP! benefit payment 
entry on Joint Exhibit 8. 
11. A copy of Employer/Surety's Summary of Payments 
dated October 31, 2014, filed with the Commission on 
November 4, 2014 and approved by the Commission on 
January 7, 2015, is provided as Joint Exhibit C. 
12. Defendants issued the final payment ofPPI lo Claimant 
in core of his attorney on June 22, 2015, by check number 
270024820 in the amount of $2,379.30. Sec Joint Exhibit D. 
13. The remittance advice attached to check number 
270024820 stated a payment description of"Pcrmanent 
Partial Scheduled/Impairment" and a comment of "PPI 
Final PaymenL11 See Joint Exhibit D. 
14. Check number 270024820, issued June 22, 2015, 
cleared Defendant Surety's bank on July IO, 2015. 
15. In the months of June and/or July 2015, Defendant 
Surety did not send to Claimant nor file with the 
Commission any NOCS (IC Fann 8) regarding Claimant's 
PPI benefits. 
16. In the months of June and/or July 2015, Defendant 
Surety did not send to Claimant or Claimant's counsel any 
written notice regarding Claimant's PPI benefits other than 
the remittance advice attached to check number 270024820 
dated June 22, 2015. See Joint Exhibit D. 
17. Claimant filed a complaint in this case with the 
Commission on July 20, 2016. Joint Exhibit E. 
18. In his complaint, Claimant raises the issue of additional 
TTD benefits and reserves issues of PPI and pennanent 
partial disability ("PPD"). See Joint Exhibit E. 
19. ln their Answer to Complaint filed with the 
Commission July 26, 2016, Defendants asserted the 
nffinnntive defense "that Claimant is barred by the statute 
oflimitations of72-706, Idaho Code, as lo any indemnity 
benefits whatsoever." Joint Exhibit F. 
20. On September 6, 2016, Defendants provided Answer to 
Interrogatory No. 3. Joint Exhibit G. 
21. Claimant's counsel requested a record ofNOCS filed 
with the Idaho Industrial Commission and, on April 24, 
2017, received a report from the Idaho Industrial 
Commission titled "Change of Status Notices Received for 
Claim Number 2008-038504." Joint Exhibit H. 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS 
22. The provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation 
Law are to be liberally construed in favor of the employee. 
Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 956, 
793 P.2d 187, 188 (1990). The humane purposes which it 
serves leave no room for narrow, technical construction. 
Ogden v. Thompson, 128 ldnho 87, 88,910 P.2d 759, 760 
(1996). However, "where the language of a statute is 
unambiguous, the clear expressed intent of the legislature 
must be given effect and there is no occasion for 
construction." City of Sun VaUey v. Sun Valley Co., 123 
ldnho 665,667, 851 P.2d 961,963 (1993). Where n statute 
is plain, clear, and unambiguous, it must be given the 
interpretation the language clearly implies. If the statute is 
socially unsound, it is the up to the legislature, not the 
courts, to correct it Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center. 151 ldnho 889,265 P.3d 502 (2011). 
23. Claimant raises two central arguments to advance his 
position. One involves the interpretation and interaction of 
several statutes; to wit, Idaho Code § 72-706(3), Idaho 
Code § 72-806, and Idaho Code § 72-604. Claimant reasons 
that Defendants' failure to send him a fonnal Notice of 
Change of Status (NOCS) when the final payment of PPI 
disability was delivered, as per Idaho Code § 72-806, tolls 
the running of the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 
Idaho Code § 72-706(3) by virtue of the tolling sanction 
found in Idaho Code § 72-604. This argument presupposes 
that Defendants were required to send Claimnnt a NOCS 
when it made its "final payment" of benefits on June 22, 
2015, and "willfully" foiled or refused to do so. 
24. Claimant's second argument asserts that the 
Commission should consider the date the last payment of 
benefits would hove been due had Surety not made an 
advance payment of seven weeks' worth of PPI benefit 
payments in a "lump sum" fashion. That date is no earlier 
than August 8, 2015. When the August date is used, 
Claimant timely filed his complaint. 
NOCS ANALYSIS 
25. Idaho Code § 72-706 is entitled Limitation on time on 
application for hearing and provides various time 
limitations for filing a complaint. The applicable provision 
in this case, Idaho Code§ 72-706(3), states in relevant part; 
72-706(3). When income benefits discontinued. If income 
benefits have been paid and discontinued more than four (4) 
years from the date of the accident causing the injury 
&hellip;, the claimant shall have one {I) year from the date 
of last payment of income benefits within which lo make 
and file with the commission an application requesting a 
hearing for additional income benefits.[l] 
Claimant received temporary disability benefits more than 
four years after his accident. Once a physician determined 
Claimant had reached MMI, Surety began paying Claimant 
PPI disability payments, as detailed below. 
26. As noted in the stipulated facts and Joint Exhibit (JE) 
A, Surety determined Claimant was entitled to PPI benefit 
payments in the sum of$18,694.50, correlated to his I 1% 
whole-person medical impairment. Surety sent Claimant an 
NOCS dated July 18, 2014 informing him of this fact 
Therein Surety stated that ITD benefits were stopping 
effective July 18,2014, and PPI payments in the weekly 
sum of$339.90 would begin on August I, 2014. Surety 
informed Claimant in this NOCS that the PPI payments 
would be paid in bi-weekly inslallments "until the award 
has been paid in full." Surety made it clear in the July 18, 
2014 NOCS that payment of the PPI benefits would not 
settle his claim. 
27. Surety began making bi-weekly payments on July 19, 
2014 in the sum of$679.80, and continued in this fashion 
until June 22, 2015, at which time it sent Claimant a check 
in the sum of 52,379.30, which represented seven weekly or 
3.5 bi-weekly PPI payments. On the face of the document, 
there was a notation under the heading "Comment" that the 
check was a "PPI Final Payment." No further PPI payments 
were forthcoming from Surety thereafter. 
28. Surety's Inst payment of income benefits occurred on 
June 22, 2015. Under the provisions of Idaho Code § 
72-706(3), it appears that Claimant had until June 22, 2016 
to file his complaint, which he did not do. However, as 
discussed below, the requirements of Idaho Code § 
72-706(3) may be tolled under certain circumstances. 
Claimant's Arguments 
29. Claimant argues that under Idaho Code § 72-806, 
Surety should have sent Claimant an NOCS when it made 
its final payment, and its failure to do so tolls the running of 
the statute of limitation contained in Idaho Code § 
72-706(3). ln relevant part Idaho Code§ 72-806 states; 
Notice of change of status. A workman shall receive 
written notice within fifteen (15) days of any change of 
status or condition including, but not limited to, the denial, 
reduction, or cessation of medical and/or monetary 
compensation benefits, which directly or indirectly affects 
the level of compensation benefits to which [the worker] 
might presently or ultimately be entitled. 
As stipulated by the parties, Surety did not send Claimant 
an NOCS when the final PPI benefits payment check in the 
sum of $2,379.30 (the check) was tendered to, and accepted 
by, Claimant. 
30. Idaho Code § 72-604 provides 11 sanction for failing to 
provide required NOCS documents. As stated therein; 
Failure to report tolls employee limitations. When the 
employer&hellip;willfully foils or refuses to file&hellip;the 
notice of change of status required by section 72-806, Idaho 
Code, the limitations prescribed in &hellip; section 72-706, 
Idaho Code, shall not run against the claim of any person 
seeking compensation until such &hellip;notice shall have 
been filed. 
31. If Surety was required to file a NOCS when it sent its 
final PP! check to Claimant, and willfully failed or refused 
to do so, the limitations of Idaho Code § 72-706(3) 
discussed above would not apply, nnd Claimant's complaint 
would stand. If Surety was not required to file a NOCS 
when it concluded its PPI payments, or conversely if it 
provided Claimant sufficient notice that it would be sending 
no further PP! checks with the notation on the face of the 
final benefits check. or if its omission was not willful, then 
Claimant's complaint was untimely filed, and would be 
subject to dismissal with prejudice. 
32. Claimant first argues Surety bad an obligation to 
provide nn NOCS with its final PPI payment because the 
final payment was in effect a cessation of monetary 
compensation benefits which directly or indirectly affected 
the level of compensation benefits which Claimant might 
presently or ultimately be entitled, thus triggering the 
requirements ofldaho Code § 72-806. When Surety failed 
in this obligation, the statute oflimitation on filing a 
complaint was tolled indefinitely. 
33. Claimant asserts the need for an NOCS is demonstrated 
in U1is case by the fact Umt various PPI payout dates can be 
calculated from the documents provided by Surety in 
discovery. The July 18, 2014 NOCS states the PPI benefits 
of$18,694.50 would be paid at the rate of$339.90, would 
begin on August 1, 2014, and would continue bi-weekly 
until "the award is paid in full. 11 The total PPI benefits 
($18,694.50) divided by the weekly benefit amount 
($339.90) would mean PPI benefits would be paid for 55 
weeks. (18,694.50/339.90 - 55). Filly-five weeks from 
August I, 2014 would make the final payment due on 
August21,2015. 
34. In fact, Surety began payments on July 19, 2014, so 
that the final installment of PPI benefits would have been 
due on August 8, 2015. AddiLionally, Surety noted on the 
check foce that final $2,379.30 payment was for benefits 
through July 3, 2015, when in reality the payment covered 
the period through August 8. Claimant argues "the 
confusing and conflicting PPI payout dates that can be 
derived from the Surety's documents drives home the need 
for the Surety to provide proper notice of the cessation of 
Claimant's PPI benefits as required by LC. § 72-806." 
Claimant's Opening Brief, p. 7. Surety's failure to comply 
with the statute tolled the statute of limitations, and thus 
Claimant's complaint was timely filed on July 20, 2016. 
35. Claimant relies on the case of Mead v. Swift 
Transportation, 2015 IIC 0041 (2015) to support his claim. 
Therein, the defendants argued the claimant's complaint 
was time barred due to late filing. However, the defendants 
had failed to file any NOCS in the case before the 
complaint was filed. The Commission ruled the statute of 
limitation was tolled by defendants' failure to comply with 
Idaho Code § 72-806. Defendants' argument that the failure 
was not willful, but rather was an inadvertent oversight, was 
rejected because the Commission found the defendants 
were aware of their legal obligation to submit the required 
NOCS and had no lawful excuse for foiling to do so. 
Claimant submits that Mead is on point and controlling in 
this matter. 
36. Finally, Claimant notes that the notation of "PPI Final 
Payment11 on the check cannot be construed as complying 
with the provisions of IDAPA 17.02.08.061.02 and .03 
which require Surety to send the NOCS to Claimant within 
ten days from the change of status on an IC Form 8 or one 
"substantially similar" thereto. Because the outcome of this 
issue does not depend on whether the notations on the 
check were substantially similar to IC Form 8, no 
conclusion is made on this point, although it is noted the 
check clid contnin most of the information provided in the 
Form 8, but not in the same formatting. 
Defendants' Arguments 
37. Defendants note this issue turns on whether they were 
legally required to provide an NOCS on a form similar to 
IC Form 8 following their PP! benefits payment in full on 
June 22, 2015. They take the position no such notice was 
required, but even if it was, the information contained on 
the final payment check. together with the amount of the 
fmal check, supplied Claimant wifu adequate notice of the 
fact his PPI benefits payments were concluded with 
payment in full. 
38. Defendants argue that Idaho Code § 72-806 requires 
notice only when the change in status or condition affects 
the level of compensation benefits to which a claimant 
might presently or ultimately be entitled. Where a claimant 
has been properly notified of a fixed amount of impainnent 
benefits which will be paid to the individual, completion of 
such payments, whether or not accelerated, does not change 
the level of benefits the claimant is presently or ultimately 
entitled to. Following Claimant's last PPI payment on June 
22, 2015, the level of benefits to which Claimant was 
entitled did not change. He received exactly what he was 
told he would receive in the July 18, 2014 NOCS. 
39. Defendants point out that if an NOCS is required when 
the last payment is received on the notion that Claimant1s 
benefits level changed when such payment was made, then 
an NOCS would be required after each installment payment 
was made, since each of those payments "decrease" 
Claimant's level of benefits to which he is entitled going 
forward. This, of course, would be an absurd reading ofl.C. 
§ 72-806. In reality, Claimant's level of benefits did not 
change; they simply went from being prospective to 
realized with each payment, and fully realized with the final 
paymenl 
40. Defendants point out that the Idaho Industrial 
Commission's Certified Idaho Worker's Compensation 
Specialist Learning Course Student Boak (of which the 
Referee took administrative notice by Order dated May 19, 
2017) lists specific, common circumstances under which a 
written notice of change of status must be issued. While 
numerous situations are provided as examples of when a 
nolice is required, completion of PPI benefit payments are 
not among them. While Defendants concede this list is not 
exhaustive, they argue that if notice is mandated each time a 
surety makes a final PPI benefits payment, which is a very 
common occurrence in worker's compensation cases, one 
would assume the Commission would have listed the event 
in their examples. 
41. Finally, Defendants distinguish Ji.lead, supra, from the 
instant case. 1n Mead, the Defendants failed to issue 
required notices, and later claimed the omission was simply 
an inadvertent mistake. Here, Defendants issued all required 
notices. The reality is that no notice was required under I.C. 
§ 72-806 when the final installment payment W!lS delivered 
toClaimanl 
Legal Analysis and Findings 
42. Idaho Code § 72-806 provides: 
A workman shall receive written notice within fifteen (15) 
days of any change of status or condition including, but not 
limited to, the denial, reduction or cessation of medical 
and/or monetary compensation benefits, which directly or 
indirectly affects the level of compensation benefits to 
which he might presently or ultimately be entitled. If any 
change in compensation benefits is based upon a medical 
report or medical reports from any physician or any other 
practitioner of the healing arts, a copy of such report shall 
be attached to the written notice which the workman shall 
receive. The industrial commission shall by rule and 
regulation, determine by whom the notice shall be given 
and the fonn for such notice. In the absence of a rule 
governing a particular situation, the employer's insurer, or 
in the case of self-insurers, the employer, shall be 
responsible for giving the notice required herein. 
Therefore, a worker shall be given written notice of any 
change of status which directly or indirectly affects the 
level of compensation benefits to which he is or might be 
entitled. Given as examples of changes that require written 
notice are denials, reductions, or cessations of the payment 
of medical/indemnity benefits. Defendants urge the 
Commission to conclude that following the receipt of the 
last payment of PPI benefits, Claimant's "level" of 
compensation did not change, even though he received no 
further payments of PPL Necessarily, because it constitutes 
one of the identified examples, Defendants must also insist 
that with the last payment of PPI benefits, it cannot be said 
thnt those payments ceased. The argument is not as 
implausible as it sounds, nnd is best illustrated by 
comparing PPI benefits to TIO benefits. TTD benefits are 
initiated when Claimant enters a period of recovery. They 
are unbounded on the other end, for it is unknown, at the 
outset, when Claimant will be determined to be medically 
stable. When Claimant eventually reaches medical stability, 
Claimant must be alerted to the fact that TTD benefits will 
be terminated because Claimant is no longer in a period of 
recovery. 
43. In contrast, wben Claimant receives an impairment 
rating, the amount of Claimant's entitlement to the payment 
of the rating admitted by Employer is known from the very 
outset As in this case, a notice of change of status is issued 
to announce the commencement of the payment of PPI 
benefits, and to further alert Claimant to the fact that he is 
entitled lo payment of a sum certain, which will be paid 
over a period of so many weeks in such~and~such an 
amount Therefore, the initial notice of change of status 
alerts Claimant to both the initiation and cessation of a 
finite award. If Claimant, or his attorney, is paying 
attention, he will know when the stated award is paid in 
full, and he should not need to be reminded of this by 
another notice of change of status which only reaffirms that 
which he was told nt the outset In fact, the final check 
received in this case did remind Claimant that payments 
were completed. 
44. Notwithstanding that a plausible case can be made for 
treating the payment of a finite PPl award differently from 
TTD or medical benefits, the statutory scheme does not 
appear to endorse such a distinction. I.C. § 72-806 must be 
examined to understand whether, with the last payment of 
PPI benefits, Claimant's PPI payments ceased, or, more 
generally speaking, his "level" of benefits was affected. 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the 
intent of the legislative body that adopted the acl Statutory 
interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. 
Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be 
interpreted in the context of the entire document The 
statute should be considered as n whole, and words should 
be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should 
be noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and 
provisions of the statute so that none will be void, 
superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language is 
unambiguous, the clearly ex.pressed intent of the legislative 
body must be given effect, and the Court need not consider 
rules of statutory construction. 
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 
(2011). "Cessation" is defined as the foct or process of 
ending or being brought to an end. Oxford Dictionaries, 
available at 
https://en.oxforddictionnries.com/definition/cessation, last 
accessed March 20, 2018. The Inst payment of PPI benefits 
brought Employer's present obligation to an end. Only by 
contorting the ordinary meaning of the term "cessation" 
could it be said that Defendants did not cease paying PPI 
benefits with the Inst check; after that check was issued, 
Claimant received no further payments. Further, we note: 
11[A]mbiguity is not established merely because differing 
interpretations are presented to a court; otherwise, all 
statutes subject to litigation would be considered 
ambiguous&hellip; [W]here statutory language is 
unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic 
evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering 
the clearly expressed intent of the legislature." 
Me/tan v. Alt, I63 Idaho I58, 408 P.3d 913, 918 (2018) 
(internal citations omitted). 
45. Moreover, in the broader sense, Claimant's 11Ievel" was 
affected by the issuance of the Inst check. 11Level," in this 
context, is most clearly synonymous with 11nmount" Oxford 
Dictionaries, available at 
https:/len.oxforddictionaries.comldefinition!level, accessed 
on March 20, 2018. Defendants argue that because 
Claimant's entitlement to the PPI award was finite, and 
because he was initially alerted to the fact that there would 
be an endpoint to the payment of these benefits, his level of 
compensation wasn't really affected when those payments 
came to an end. The end was expected and nothing 
changed. Again, while this argument is not implausible, 
there is no support for it in the plain language of the stntute. 
Claimant received periodic payment of PPI benefits, and at 
some point those payments came to an end. The level 
(amount) of money he periodically received was therefore 
"affected" by the receipt of the last payment, for Claimant 
received no further payments thereafter. Based on the 
foregoing, the argument that the cessation of PPI benefits 
did not require Defendants to issue n notice of change of 
status is rejected. 
46. Based on our determination that an Idaho Code § 
72-806 notice was required lo announce that with the last 
check, Claimant's PPI payments would cease, we do not 
reach the other arguments raised by Defendants in 
connection with Idaho Code § 72-706. Because Defendants 
did not issue the required Idaho Code § 72-806 notice, the 
limitation provisions ofldaho Code § 72-706 are tolled by 
operation ofldnho Code § 72-604. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
1. Defendants were required to give Claimant written 
notice of the cessation of PPI benefits per Idaho Code § 
72-806; 
2. By operation of Idaho Code § 72-604, failure to give 
such written notice tolls the limitation provisions ofldaho 
Code§ 72-706; 
3. Claimant's complaint is timely; and 
4. Pursuant lo Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final 
and conclusive to all matters adjudicated. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner, Aaron White, 
Commissioner 
Notes: 
[I] The term "application requesting a hearing for 
additional benefits" is commonly known as a complaint. 
